We consider the problem of a planner or ethical observer who wants to derive a collective preference ordering over a set of feasible alternatives from the knowledge of individual utility functions. By assumption, he is concerned with social welfare judgements, not with committee decisions.
1 axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Section 2 proceeds from Arrow's celebrated theorem, which is based on the prohibition of interpersonal welfare comparisons. It then moves to two invariance axioms which respectively allow for interpersonal comparisons of welfare gains and for interpersonal comparisons of welfare levels. With help of the former axiom, we get a characterization of utilitarianism which is adapted from Milnor [7] . With the help of the latter, we characterize the leximin principle, making use of a theorem due to Hammond [3] . Our result is close to a theorem arrived at independently by Strasnick [13] .
Proofs, technical lemmas and some heuristic comments are contained in Section 3.
General
We consider a set of individuals N = {1, 2, ..., i, j, ..., n} which is finite, and a set of feasible social states, X = {x, y, z, ...} which consists of s elements. This number may be infinite or finite. In any case, we assume s ≥ 3.
We let be the set of all orderings 2 on X. For every R ∈ , ∀ x, y ∈ X, xRy means that x is at least as good as y from the collective standpoint, as the planner sees it. We denote strict preference and indifference by P and I, respectively.
We let U be the set of all numerical bounded functions which may be defined on X × N .
For every u ∈ U , ∀i ∈ N , ∀x, y ∈ X, u(x, i) ≥ u(y, i) means x is at least as good as y from the point of view of individual i, as the planner sees it. Thus, it is legitimate to interpret u(·, i) as agent i's utility function, seen through the planner's eyes.
To use Sen's [9] terminology, a social welfare functional (SWFL) is a function f from U to . For every u, u 1 , u 2 ∈ U we shall write R = f (u),
We proceed by describing some "reasonable" conditions or axioms one might wish to impose on SWFL's. Let us first specify the planner's informational basis. By this term, we mean his ability to discriminate more or less finely among the elements of U . It is embodied in an invariance axiom. We shall describe briefly six such axioms. For a fuller treatment, the reader is referred to Sen [12] .
At one end of the spectrum of relevant possibilities, we may, as K. J. Arrow [1] did in his pioneering work, assume that individual utility functions are measurable up to a positive monotonic transformation and that interpersonal comparisons are ruled out.
In other words, individual utility functions are ordinal and non-comparable. Formally,
Weaker invariance axioms may be obtained by introducing cardinality or interpersonal comparability, or both. For instance, if we introduce interpersonal welfare comparisons while maintaining ordinality, we get, in Hammond's terms, an axiom of coordinality:
It should be clear that CO allows for interpersonal comparisons of welfare levels. As such, it rules out interpersonal comparisons of welfare gains.
Another way to relax ON is to assume that individual utility functions are cardinal and non-comparable. Formally, we get
If we require all α i to be the same and all β i to be the same, we impose in effect a common origin and a common scale to all individual utility functions. Thus, both comparisons of welfare levels and comparisons of welfare gains are allowed for among individuals. Utility functions are cardinal and fully comparable, or co-cardinal.
Between CN and CC, we shall single out two interesting cases, although they may seem less natural than CC in the context of our problem. In the first case, the origin of individual utility functions is common while the scale factors may vary from individual to individual. We call this the axiom of invariance with respect to individual units of measurement.
In the other case of cardinality with imperfect interpersonal comparability, we assume that the origin of utility functions may vary, while their scale factor must be common. In this case, interpersonal comparisons of welfare gains are permitted, while interpersonal comparisons of welfare levels are prohibited. We call this the axiom of invariance with respect to individual origins of utilities.
In Table I we compare our six invariance axioms with respect to both measurability and interpersonal comparability. An arrow between axioms indicates logical implication. The weaker an invariance axiom is, the more natural it becomes to view the aggregation process as based on subjective welfare evaluation. We take these subjective judgements as given, and we limit our discussion to the aggregation procedure proper. 
With our comprehensive definition of U , it turns out that IUM and CN are equivalent. Another equivalence between invariance axioms shows up when f is required to satisfy a principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. A short discussion of the latter is thus in order. When an individual is to rank the elements of a possibility set, his preferences with respect to elements which lie outside it should be considered as irrelevant. It seems reasonable to extend this idea to individual preferences aggregation. There are various ways of formalizing this principle which are more or less stringent. For every integer m such that 1 < m < s, one can define what Blau [2] has called an m-ary principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives:
The most demanding member of this family of axioms would seem to be IR 2 , as it clearly implies the other members, while the converse is not so evident. If IR 2 is adopted, all the relevant information pertaining to collective choice within any pair {x, y} is contained in the two lists of utility levels u(x, i), u(y, i), i = 1, ..., n. As Sen [9] observed, CN must then be equivalent to ON. Indeed, one needs at least three distinct measurements to get a nontrivial comparison of gains. However, Sen's argument is not enough to get this equivalence when IR m with m > 2 is adopted. Now Blau [2] has shown that for an Arrow social welfare function, an m-ary independence principle is equivalent to a binary principle. His arguments apply also to SWFL's, whatever the invariance axiom may be, even when a wider definition of their range is adopted. Hence, whatever m-ary principle of independence is chosen, CN and ON are equivalent. Let us record these facts formally.
Lemma 1 For every integer m, 1 < m < s − 1, f satisfies IR m if, and only if, it satisfies IR m+1 .
In view of the above lemma, we let the reader choose the m-ary independence principle he pleases, provided 1 < m < s, and we denote it by IR, for brevity's sake. Finally, using again
Sen's argument, Lemma 1 trivially implies:
Theorem 2 A SWFL satisfying IR satisfies CN if, and only if, it satisfies ON.
By Theorems 1 and 2 our six initial invariance axioms may be reduced to four, viz. ON, IOU, CO and CC.
We turn now to the strong version of the Pareto principle, which we shall use repeatedly.
SP:
For every x, y ∈ X, ∀ u ∈ U , xRy if, ∀ i ∈ N, u(x, i) ≥ u(y, i); and if, moreover, for some
Taken together, IR and SP imply a property which we call extended neutrality (XNE). It says that all the information which matters for collective choice is captured by the relevant utility levels. In particular, state labels do not matter. Formally, f satisfies XNE if, and only if, ∀ x, y ∈ X, ∀ u 1 ∈ U , xR 1 y (respectively xP 1 y), whenever there exist w, z ∈ X, and u 0 ∈ U ,
) and wR 0 z (respectively wP 0 z). It is worth observing that XNE implies IR 2 , so that if may be considered as more demanding than
May's [6] neutrality axiom. From another viewpoint, the latter axiom is much stronger than XNE, as it implies ON, while XNE does not imply any invariance axiom.
Lemma 2 If f satisfies IR and SP, it satisfies XNE.
To conclude this section we want to mention that if f satisfies XNE, one may associate with it a binary relation R * on the utility space, which is an ordering if R is an ordering. This ordering is an essential link between the SWFL and the familiar concept of social welfare function as it was formulated by Bergson.
Let E N be the n-dimensional Euclidean space, where each coordinate bears the name of a distinct individual. We define on E N a binary relation R * as follows: ∀ a, b ∈ E N , aR * b iff there exist x, y ∈ X, and u ∈ U , such that ∀ i ∈ N , u(x, i) = a i , u(y, i) = b i and xRy.
Lemma 3 If f satisfies XNE, R * is an ordering on E N .
Utilitarianism and the leximin principle
As a starting-point, we would like to remind the reader that ruling out interpersonal welfare comparisons is potentially quite dangerous from the point of view of equity. Indeed, we may interpret Arrow's classical theorem as follows: if we require our SWFL to satisfy both IR and SP, then we know that the only f which satisfies ON (or, equivalently, CN or IUM) is dictatorial.
Under dictatorship, there is an individual which is given all the weight in the aggregation process. Nothing accounts for this privilege, but his name. Equity would seem to require that collective choice be unchanged when individuals exchange position: what really matters in each state is the list of individual utility levels, not the names attached to them. This idea is captured by the well known anonymity axiom.
A: Let σ be any permutation of N ;
By allowing the planner to compare welfare gains interpersonally, we get in position to move away from dictatorship to utilitarianism. Our theorem is a straightforward adaptation of a result presented by Milnor [7] in the context of the theory of decision under uncertainty.
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In the narrow sense of the term, we define utilitarianism as the SWFL which is such that, ∀ u ∈ U, ∀ x, y ∈ X, xRy if, and only if,
Theorem 3 Utilitarianism is characterized by IR, SP, A and IOU.
In the pure income distribution problem, diminishing marginal utility is a natural assumption which guarantees equal incomes for any two individuals who may be distinguished only by their names. This is an attractive feature from the point of view of equity.
On the other hand, utilitarianism implies a complete lack of concern for the distribution of utility levels. Many authors criticize it on this ground. See for instance Rawls [8] and Sen [10] .
This feature is of course built in the invariance axiom IOU.
Our next step is to substitute coordinality for IOU. We require again our SWFL to satisfy IR, SP and A. Another axiom proves very useful in the present context. It deals with the effect on collective choice of individuals, who are indifferent between all states in X. Sen [9] aptly calls them unconcerned individuals. It would seem unreasonable to allow the welfare level of unconcerned individuals to influence collective choice. Thus we introduce an axiom of separability with respect to unconcerned individuals.
It is easy to see that all invariance axioms which prohibit interpersonal comparisons of welfare levels imply SE. Combining SE with CO, IR, SP and A has drastic consequences from the point of view of equity. This is for instance brought forth in cases where only two individuals are in conflict about two states. The other individuals being indifferent, we further assume that one of the conflicting individuals is worse off than the other in both states. Extremist equity considerations would let the worst off individual win in all cases.
XE: For every u ∈ U , ∀ x, y ∈ X, ∀ i, j ∈ N , xP y whenever, ∀ g ∈ (N \ {i, j}), u(x, g) = u(y, g), and u(y, i) < u(x, i) < u(x, j) < u(y, j).
In total contrast with XE, the planner might decide that the better off individual wins in all cases. We would have thus the following inequity principle.
IN:
For every u ∈ U , ∀ x, y ∈ X, ∀ i, j ∈ N , yP x whenever, ∀ g ∈ (N \ {i, j}), u(x, g) = u(y, g), and u(y, i) < u(x, i) < u(x, j) < u(y, j).
We are now ready for
If f satisfies IR, SP, A, CO and SE, either it satisfies XE or it satisfies IN.
Despite some cogent examples due to Harsanyi [4] , some people may find XE appealing.
However, the full force of its extremism becomes clear when the worst off individual is in conflict with all the more favoured individuals. Indeed, under our assumptions, his strict preference is always endorsed by the collective ordering. The notion of dictatorship which applies to individuals in Arrow's framework extends naturally to ranks in the present context.
Formally, let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of ranks. Given any rank h ∈ N , we need identify whoever occupies it in any particular state. For this purpose, we define for every u ∈ U , ∀ x ∈ X, a one-to-one function i x from N to N , which satisfies the following condition:
If there are ties, several i x functions satisfy this requirement. Whichever function is selected has, as it will become clear, no bearing on the final outcome.
The leximin (or lexical maximim) principle is the SWFL selecting as a dictator the least favoured non-indifferent rank. It was defined by Sen [9] in relation to Rawls' [8] work. It was further studied by Kolm [5] , among others.
The leximin principle is defined as follows: ∀ u ∈ U, ∀ x, y ∈ X, xP y if, and only if, ∃, m ∈ N such that, ∀ h ∈ N , h < m, u(y, i y (h)) = u(x, i x (h)), and u(y, i y (m)) < u(x, i x (m)). The strength of XE is manifested by the fact that the following theorem does not rely on any invariance axiom. The separability axiom is also conspicuously absent.
Theorem 5
The leximin principle is characterized by IR, SP, A and XE.
The argument used in proving this theorem is due to Hammond [3] , who points out in turn his debt to Strasnick [13] . Going back to the definition of leximin, and writing m < h instead of h < m, we get the formal definition of what may be called the leximax principle, a SWFL based on the dictatorship of the most favoured non-indifferent rank. The following theorem is symmetric to Theorem 5.
Theorem 6
The leximax principle is characterized by IR, SP, A and IN.
We next introduce a minimal equity axiom which requires no comments.
ME:
The SWFL is not the leximax principle.
Finally, as an easy consequence of the last three theorems, we get a new characterization of the leximin principle.
Theorem 7
The leximin principle is characterized by IR, SP, A, CO, SE and ME.
We may now usefully compare utilitarianism with the leximin principle by collecting in Table   II the most important results of this paper.
Axioms, which taken together, characterize a SWFL, are marked with a star in the table.
Axioms which are consistent (respectively inconsistent) with a SWFL get a + (respectively −) mark. We observe that the consistency of utilitarianism with ME does not mean that for all members of U the leximax principle and utilitarianism give different collective orderings. We also observe that the only source of discrepancy lies in the informational basis of each SWFL.
If the cost of gathering and processing information is high, one may be tempted to adopt the leximin principle on the ground that CO is less demanding in this respect than IOU. We feel, however, that, once interpersonal comparisons are allowed for, informational cost differentials are illusory. The only natural form of invariance would then be expressed by the axiom of co-cardinality.
We conclude that it would be a worthwhile task to find out which SWFL's, besides utilitarianism and the leximin principle, satisfy CC, IR, SP, A, SE and ME.
Technical
Proof of Theorem 1. We need only prove that IUM implies CN. Choose any u 1 ∈ U , any
By construction, we have β
In view of IUM, we have
Proof of Lemma 1. We only prove sufficiency. Consider Therefore, ∀ x, y ∈ A, xR 1 y iff xRy iff xR 2 y.
Proof of Lemma 2. Three cases must e distinguished, according as {x, y} ∩ {w, z} is empty, has one element or two. Consider the last case; suppose, ∀ i ∈ N ,
By assumption, s > 2. In view of our comprehensive definition of U , we may choose v ∈ X, x = v = y, and u 2 , u 3 , u 4 ∈ U , as described in Table III .
Now by IR we can write:
By SP we can also write:
Combining these equivalences, we get:
In this set of equivalent assertions, strict collective preference may obviously be substituted for weak collective preference. When {x, y} and {w, z} have fewer common elements, analogous, but shorter, arguments lead to the desired conclusion. The strict preference case is proved along the same lines.
Proof of Lemma 3. In view of our definition of U , and because R is total and reflexive, the relation R * is total and reflexive. To establish transitivity, take any a, b, c ∈ E N such that aR * b and bR * c. By our definition of U , there exist x, y, z ∈ X and u ∈ U , such that, ∀ i ∈ N ,
, and c i = u(z, i). By XNE, xRy and yRz. As R is an ordering, we get xRz, which in turn implies aR * c. Hence R * is an ordering.
We turn next to a useful implication of IR, SP and A.
Lemma 4 Suppose f satisfies IR, SP and A. Then, ∀ u ∈ U , ∀ x, y ∈ X, xIy if there exists a permutation σ of N such that, ∀ i ∈ N , u(x, i) = u(y, σ(i)).
Proof. Consider first the simple case in which only two agents exchange welfare levels. Suppose for some i, j ∈ N, u(x, i) = u(y, j) = α and u(x, j) = u(y, i) = β, while
Select u 0 , u 1 ∈ U such that, for every g, i = g = j, the utility level is γ g in all cases and all states, and for i and j, we assume
while their preferences with respect to x and y are described in Table IV . We want to show that, if xIy is false, we must have a contradiction. Suppose xP y. By IR, this implies xP 0 y. Now, by A, xP 0 y implies xP 1 y. However, by Lemma 2, xP 1 y implies yP 0 x, which contradicts xP 0 y. By Lemma 2, x and y must be socially indifferent, if they satisfy the condition mentioned in the theorem.
Our next lemma deals with a list of properties which the ordering or the utility space R * inherits from f . 
In view of the above discussion, we leave it to the reader to prove:
Lemma 5 The ordering R * satisfies SP * if f satisfies IR and SP; if f satisfies also IOU (respectively CO, A), then R * satisfies IOU * (respectively CO * , A * ).
It is now a straightforward task to use Milnor's [7] argument together with the above lemmas, in order to characterize utilitarianism.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof of necessity is left to the reader. To prove sufficiency, consider
Let a 0 (respectively b 0 ) ∈ E N be obtained by permuting the elements of a (respectively b) so that they are in order of increasing size. By Lemma 5, we get aI * a * and bI Further properties with R * inherits from f are SE * , XE * , and IN * .
We leave it to the reader to prove: Given any utility vector, we shall need to find out which individual occupies which welfare rank. For this purpose, for every a ∈ E N , we define a function i from N to N satisfying 
Select now a 2 , b 2 ∈ E N such that, By A * and SE * , if these results hold for some h, k ∈ N , h < k, it is also true for all r, s ∈ N such that r < s.
To complete the proof, there remains to eliminate the possibility of indifference. Thus, assume that a 0 I * b 0 and select c ∈ E N as follows:
and ∀ g ∈ (N \ {h}), c i(g) = a 0 i(g) . By our previous argument, we get cI * b 0 . By transitivity, cI * a 0 , which contradicts SP * . Thus, the lemma is established.
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider any i, j ∈ N , any a, b ∈ E N such that, ∀ g ∈ (N \ {i, j}), a g = b g and b i < a i < a j < b j . Hammond [3] . Of course, the proofs must be put in terms of utility levels. It is worth point out that XE is actually stronger than Hammond's equity axiom and that our Lemma 4 corresponds to his condition S. Moreover, no invariance axiom is required to carry out the argument as it is translated.
To conclude, we observe that Theorem 6 is symmetrical to Theorem 5. As pointed out, Theorem 7 is a corollary of Theorems 4, 5 and 6. 
